In the NYTimes, an argument for tighter bank regulation
Governments should fully guarantee all bank deposits — and impose much tighter restrictions on risk-taking by banks. Banks should be forced to shed activities like derivatives trading that regulators cannot easily examine.
Right now in the U.S. FDIC insurance only covers $250,000. The author argues that if all deposits were 100% guarenteed, there would be fewer bank runs and financial crises would not be so bad. To mitigate risky lending, the government should act as a tight regulator, and ban trading in financial instruments like derivatives.
AM: Unfortunately, the author does not address some of the counterarguments. Fully insured deposits would create a major moral hazard problem as the rich depositers would not care at all what banks did with their money. This problem already exists to some degree, I would imagine, with insured deposits. The author would likely counter that "this is the point of regulation." I would respond: "you have a lot of faith in regulators."
There is no resolving this one, but the contours are familar: which way should we choose, more bottom up or more top down? I have more faith in bottom up. Banks don't 'self regulate' but they do act in their own self-interest and respond to incentives. Risk taking has been fed by a culture of bail outs, which created a massive moral hazard problem. FDIC insurance (and bail outs in general) perverts incentives, and so you need top down oversight, sure. But that creates its own problems: regulators don't have perfect information; they are subject to capture by private and political interests; they create new burdens of compliance and new inefficiencies.